

NORDIC RESPONSE 2024

Messaging platform for civil authorities and total defence stakeholders

Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), in cooperation with the Norwegian Armed Forces, has drafted overarching civil messaging to the population in connection with the exercise Nordic Response 2024 (NR24).

The document is unclassified, and the content can be used as a basis for anyone communicating about the exercise and its consequences.

In addition, each individual authority and other total defence stakeholders must define whether, and if applicable, how they will communicate about their own roles and responsibilities in connection with NR24. A fundamental principle for communication about the exercise and its consequences is that relevant information must be published where the public naturally seeks to find it.

For any enquiries concerning the messaging platform, please contact DSB's Head of Press Morten Harangen, at morten.harangen@dsb.no or on +47 412 93 770.

Background for the exercise

Traditionally, the exercise Cold Response has been conducted in Northern Norway every second year. As Finland is now a member of NATO and Sweden has applied for membership, the exercise has been expanded and is now known as Nordic Response 2024.

The exercise is part of the NATO exercise Steadfast Defender in Germany, Poland and the Baltic states and is integrated with a British-led marine exercise – Joint Warrior - which is being conducted in the sea areas between Scotland, Norway and Iceland.

Further information about the exercise can be found here: [Nordic Response 2024](#) (source: Norwegian Armed Forces).

Scenario and objectives

The scenario for the exercise is an Article 5 situation in Europe. This refers to an article in what is generally known as the North Atlantic Treaty from 1949, which formed the basis for the formation of NATO.

Article 5 in the Treaty is key. It states among other things that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".

Further information about the Treaty is available here: [North Atlantic Treaty](#) (source: NATO).

With NR24, Norway and NATO wish to demonstrate their ability, strength and willingness to defend their territory - and by doing so deter an enemy from attacking.

In the event of a critical security crisis or war in Norway, NATO is the guarantor of our safety. Therefore it is important for allied forces to regularly conduct exercises in the cold, Arctic climate in Northern Norway. It is similarly important that Norway's military forces and civil resources can prepare for, receive and work together with allied reinforcements.

NR24 also provides the opportunity to strengthen Norway's total defence and Nordic cooperation on total defence.

Exercise area

The exercise will be apparent and visible to the public from Bjerkvik in Inner Troms and further towards the North East, to Alta and Central Finnmark.

In addition, there will be extensive activity in the sea areas off the coast of the counties of Troms and Finnmark and the airspace above these areas. The Norwegian Armed Forces inform that the public will notice these activities to a limited degree.

The exercise will involve border crossings between Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Timeline

January - March: Nordic Response 2024 will begin in January and allied forces will arrive in Norway with personnel, materiel and vehicles. The forces will conduct winter training, i.e. training in carrying out military operations. Winter training will mainly take place in Troms county.

25 February – 5 March: The allied forces will move into the exercise area, mainly in Alta and nearby areas. The forces will primarily be transported by ship; however, some military vehicles will use various roads. By 5 March, all of the forces will have arrived at their starting positions.

We recommend that you read the information concerning traffic safety here: [Sikkerhet på øvelse](#) (source: Norwegian Armed Forces).

5-14 March: Field exercises will be conducted. Key operations will be shore landings of amphibious forces on beaches etc., primarily in the Hammerfest and Kvænangen areas. The main manoeuvres will be conducted from Alta and southwards, and from Hetta in Finland northwards. In addition, a manoeuvre is planned at Sennalandet.

Contact point in the Norwegian Armed Forces: FOH press contact at foh.info@mil.no or on +47 404 38 083.

Nordic Response 2024 - key figures

- > Over 20 000 soldiers
- > Participants from 14 countries
- > Around 110 combat aircraft, helicopters and other aircraft
- > More than 50 frigates, submarines and other seacraft

These figures may change prior to the start-up of field exercises.

Traffic information

During certain periods the exercise will impact traffic in Troms and Finnmark. Traffic information will be available where the public normally finds traffic information:

At vegvesen.no/trafikk/en the public can find traffic information from the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. The app [Vegvesen Trafikk](#) provides an overview and notifications for your area. The public can also follow @VTSnord on X (formerly Twitter) to receive traffic updates.

During field exercises, the Norwegian Armed Forces will provide daily traffic updates associated with military traffic, both in NRK district programmes and other regional media.

Reactions to the exercise

Nordic Response 2024 is a defensive and transparent exercise which will be carried out in line with international agreements and obligations.

However, given the current security policy situation, negative reactions to the exercise can be anticipated, including the dissemination of fake news.

Read more about fake news here: [How to recognise fake news](#) (source: DSB)

About intelligence and threat assessment in Norway (source: PST)

Several countries' intelligence services operate on Norwegian territory.

In PST's opinion, Russian intelligence services pose the greatest threat in Norway. Foreign states' intelligence services employ a wide variety of methods and means in Norway, including computer network operations, the recruitment of sources, covert procurement activities, digital and physical sabotage and influence operations.

PST wishes to be contacted if individuals or companies register undesired activity and there is a reason to believe this can be implemented by state or threat actors.

There should be a low threshold for reporting incidents.

Extreme Islamic and right-wing extremism is expected to pose the greatest terror threat to Norway. PST believes there is a possibility that both Islamic extremists and right-wing extremists will attempt to carry out terrorist acts in Norway.

For a complete description of the threat assessment in Norway, we refer to the National Threat Assessment 2023.

Islamic extremism and right-wing extremism are expected to represent the greatest terrorist threats to Norwegian society.

Further information is available here: [Introduction to National Threat Assessment 2023](#)

How to contact PST: [Form for tips to PST](#) or call +47 23 30 50 00.

Local police can be contacted on: 02800.

In the event of a serious threat incident, call the police emergency number 112.

Total defence and host nation support

"Total defence" refers to Norway's collective preparedness resources - both military and civil. This involves mutual support and cooperation between the Norwegian Armed Forces and the civil community within the entire crisis spectrum, from peace, via security policy crises, to war.

In the event of a serious crisis, situation or armed conflict, the needs of the Norwegian Armed Forces for civil support in the form of goods, services, personnel and access to infrastructure will far exceed the resources required by the defence forces on a general daily basis.

Key requirements for the Armed Forces will be road, rail, sea and air transport (with associated infrastructures) for the movement of personnel, materiel and

supplies, in addition to evacuation.

Access to civil health services, more specialised services such as maintenance and engineering services and several smaller, but specialist capacities such as meteorological services, will be critical.

There will be a need for a range of goods, the most important of which are fuel supplies (aviation fuel is a particular challenge) to support transport services and Armed Forces operations.

Both civil suppliers who support the Armed Forces, and to some degree the Armed Forces themselves, are also dependent on fundamental services such as electricity supplies and to an increasing degree civil IT infrastructures and services.

Nordic total defence

DSB carries out extensive exchange of experience and information regarding the Norwegian total defence model and the civil part of NATO with other civil Nordic sister organisations - particularly those in Sweden.

A Nordic total defence will provide major advantages and opportunities for the utilisation of joint resources within both civil-military cooperation and Nordic preparedness and crisis management in general. Therefore it is both a strategic and political aim to further develop the Nordic total defence cooperation, and the theme is foremost on the agenda in several Nordic collaboration arenas, both on the civil and military sides.

In particular, in the area of host nation support, it is important to have extensive Nordic cooperation.

Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO will likely mean that we cannot simply be a recipient country for allied support. We must be prepared to be a transit country for support via Norway to Sweden and Finland.

Cooperation regarding total defence issues has already been established at a regional level, organised by County Governors and County Officers along the border(s). We will follow this up further.

A Nordic NATO is also likely to alter the centre of gravity of security policy in Norway. This means that other than traditional areas of regional/municipal authority levels from Trøndelag and northwards, areas in other parts of the country will become involved too.

DSB and Nordic Response 2024

For DSB, NR24 is an actual incident - not an exercise. This will also be the case for most other civil total defence stakeholders.

The principal task of DSB in connection with NR24 is safeguarding the coordination role. This involves, among other things:

- > Conducting cooperation meetings in connection with planning and implementation of civil host nation support, along with communication regarding the exercise.
- > Initiating and composing a risk and vulnerability overview, including possible mitigating measures.
- > Participating in public information meetings under the direction of the Norwegian Armed Forces.
- > Assisting in ensuring that necessary information about NR24 and its consequences reaches local authorities, total defence stakeholders and special target groups. Examples of target groups are reindeer husbandry, those in charge of coincident events (e.g. Finnmarksløpet dogsled race) and vulnerable groups (e.g. children, refugees, developmentally disabled and seniors).
- > Being physically present during the exercise, both in the Armed Forces' various environments and at the press and information centre in Alta.